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2Abstract
When creating a public good, strategies or mechanisms are required to handle defectors. We
first show mathematically and numerically that prior agreements with posterior compensations
provide a strategic solution that leads to substantial levels of cooperation in the context of Public
Goods games, results that are corroborated by available experimental data. Notwithstanding
this success, one cannot, as with other approaches, fully exclude the presence of defectors,
raising the question of how they can be dealt with to avoid the demise of the common good.
We show that both avoiding creation of the common good, whenever full agreement is not
reached, and limiting the benefit that disagreeing defectors can acquire, using costly restriction
mechanisms, are relevant choices. Nonetheless, restriction mechanisms are found the more
favorable, especially in larger group interactions. Given decreasing restriction costs, introducing
restraining measures to cope with public goods free-riding issues is the ultimate advantageous
solution for all participants, rather than avoiding its creation.
Keywords: evolutionary games, cooperation, commitment, public goods.
31 Introduction1
Arranging a prior commitment or agreement is an essential ingredient to encourage coopera-2
tive behavior in a wide range of relationships, ranging from personal to political and religious3
ones1–5. Prior agreements clarify the intentions and preferences of other players. Hence, re-4
fusing to establish an agreement may be considered as intending or preferring not to cooperate5
(non-committers)5–7. Prior agreements may be highly rewarding in group situations, as in the6
case of Public Goods Games (PGG)8, as it forces the other participants to signal their willing-7
ness to achieve a common goal. Especially for increasing group sizes, such prior agreements8
could be ultimately rewarding, as it becomes more and more difficult to assess the aspirations9
of all participants.10
In a PGG, where players meet in groups of size N 9,10, all players can choose whether to11
cooperate and contribute an amount, c, to the public good or to defect and take advantage of the12
public good without contributing to it. The total contribution is multiplied by a constant public13
goods producing factor, r > 1, and the result is afterwards distributed equally among all players.14
With r smaller than the group size (r < N ), non-contributing free-riders always gain more than15
contributors. Evolutionary game dynamics has shown that under those conditions cooperation16
disappears, which is famously known as the ‘tragedy of commons’10,11. Various mechanisms,17
such as direct and indirect reciprocity, kin and group selections, and costly punishment, have18
been proposed and evaluated both theoretically and experimentally, which explain the evolu-19
tion of cooperation nevertheless10,12,13, ranging from microbial systems to animals and humans20
societies12,14–18.21
Here, we examine a strategic solution based on prior agreements to address the problem of22
the evolution of cooperation in PGG. Prior to the PGG, commitment proposing players ask their23
co-players to commit to contribute to the PGG, paying a personal proposer’s cost to establish24
4that agreement. If all the requested co-players accept the commitment, the proposers assume25
that everyone will contribute to the public good. Those individuals that commit yet later do26
not contribute receive a penalty and are forced to compensate the proposers at a cost6,19,20. As27
such, our model explicitly and novelly addresses the relevance of the commitment proposing28
behavior regarding posterior compensations in group interactions, which has been suggested to29
be a major pathway to the emergence of cooperation1,5.30
As commitment proposers may encounter also non-committers, they require strategies that31
can deal with this kind of individuals1,6,21. When dealing with non-committers, the simplest32
strategy is to not participate in the creation of the common good or, when the interaction is33
mandatory, to simply not contribute, i.e. defect9,22, when not everyone commits. Yet, this34
avoidance strategy also removes the benefits for those that wished to establish the public good,35
hindering any advancements they could harness from this novel resource. Alternatively, one36
can try to establish boundaries on the common good so that only those that commit to make37
it work have access or that the benefit non-contributors can acquire from the common good is38
reduced, as is the case for food sharing, aid in social health and defence against predators23–25.39
An extreme case of exercising restriction is ostracism, which can be enforced through financial40
or social means26,27. Experimental studies with PGG have shown that the threat of excluding41
or ostracizing non-cooperative members from the PGG can significantly increase contribution42
and cooperation28,29. As public goods are by definition non-excludable8,30, ostracism may not43
be possible and non-committers may only be excluded to a certain degree. Moreover, a cost44
may be associated with this exclusion strategy, where the capacity to ostracize may be too45
costly. Evidence regarding restriction abounds in biological and social contexts: Animals fence46
and defend territory and resources25. Trade restrictions against non-participating countries are47
widely implemented in international and environmental treaties8,31, yet may be circumvented.48
While showing the relevance of our prior conclusions on commitment obtained for the pair-49
5wise prisoner’s dilemma (PD)20 within the context of the more complex PGG, we focus here50
on showing mathematically and numerically how best to deal with individuals that do not wish51
to make prior agreements and do not contribute to the common good. This issue is not only52
essential in the general discussion of the PGG, it is also fundamental in case of the strategic53
commitment behavior since we observed in the PD that the number of non-committers, to-54
gether with those that free-ride on the investment of committers, increase markedly with the55
increase of the cost of setting up the commitment20. We will examine under which conditions56
avoidance, which is a generalization of the PD commitment behavior towards the PGG, and re-57
stricting strategies are beneficial in the PGG, determining at the same time the condition when58
the latter strategy is preferred over the former. The effect of the different parameters implicit59
to the strategies on their viability is carefully analyzed. Interestingly, we will show that group60
size is an important factor in determining the conditions for which restriction may be better than61
simply avoiding non-committers.62
2 Results63
2.1 Commitment strategies in PGG64
Commitment strategies can propose a commitment deal to all members of the group before65
playing the PGG. The proposer(s) share the cost P , while those who do not (but still can66
join the commitment) pay nothing. If all the requested co-players agree to the commitment,67
they are assumed to contribute to the public good. Those that commit though later do not68
contribute have to compensate the commitment proposers at their personal cost δ, and their69
compensation is shared among all proposers. Additionally, there may be group members that70
refuse the agreement, wishing to play the game without any prior commitment. As refusal71
may be conceived as a future defection (no contribution), proposers may wish to either avoid72
6interacting with them or set up some mechanism that restricts their access to the public good.73
We define those strategies as follows:74
• AVOID: refuses to play the game when there are non-committers in the group (hence, the75
PGG does not take place and each player receives 0 payoff).76
• RESTRICT: sets up, at an extra cost R, a mechanism to restrict the access of the non-77
committers to the public good. This restriction is modeled through a factor, ψ < 1,78
representing the fraction of the common resource the non-committers receive compared79
to the committed players (i.e. the smaller ψ the greater the effect).80
Next to the traditional unconditional contributors (C, who always commit when being proposed81
a commitment deal, contribute whenever the PGG is played, but do not propose commitment)82
and unconditional non-contributors (D, who do not accept commitment, defect when the PGG is83
played, and do not propose commitment), we consider two commitment free-riding strategies,84
which we have shown to become dominant under certain conditions in the pair-wise PD situa-85
tion20: (i) fake committers (FAKE), who accept a commitment proposal yet do not contribute86
whenever the PGG is played. These players assume that they can exploit the commitment87
proposing players without suffering the consequences; (ii) commitment free-riders (FREE),88
who defect unless being proposed a commitment, which they then accept and cooperate subse-89
quently in the PGG. In other words, these players are willing to contribute when a commitment90
is proposed but are not prepared to pay the cost of setting it up.91
We consider a well-mixed, finite population of a constant size Z, potentially composed92
of those five strategies, i.e. AVOID (or RESTRICT), C, FREE, D, and FAKE. To simplify the93
notations, the strategies are numerated 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively (where 1 can either indicate94
the AVOID or RESTRICT strategy). In each interaction, N individuals are randomly selected95
from the population for playing the PGG. Among N randomly selected players, the number96
7of players in the group of size N using strategy i is denoted by Ni, i = 1, . . . , 5, such that97
N = N1 +N2 +N3 +N4 +N5.98
We compute the payoffs of either the AVOID or RESTRICT strategy in the population in99
relation to the other strategies (see Methods and Supporting Information (SI)). In case of the100
AVOID strategy, if there is a D player in the group, i.e. N4 ≥ 1, the game is not played and101
every player in the group obtains 0 (the results will be unchanged if the game is not optional, as102
in that case, AVOID players contribute nothing to the public good). In case of the RESTRICT103
strategy, the game is always played and RESTRICT players share an additional cost, R >104
0, to restrict the benefits D players can obtain from the public good. The committing player105
(RESTRICT, C, FREE and FAKE) and non-committing player (D) in the PGG gain respectively106
r(N1+N2+N3)
N1+N2+N3+ψN4+N5
c and r(N1+N2+N3)ψ
N1+N2+N3+ψN4+N5
c. The gain for a RESTRICT player is reduced by107
c + 1
N1
P − N5N1 δ, if N4 = 0, and by c + 1N1 (P + R) − N5N1 δ, otherwise. The payoff for a C108
and a FREE player is reduced by c. Finally, the payoff for a FAKE player is reduced by δ. The109
detailed calculation of the payoff for each strategy as well as the payoff matrix is provided in110
SI.111
2.2 Constraints for viability of AVOID and RESTRICT112
We derive the conditions for which commitment strategies, AVOID and RESTRICT, are evo-113
lutionary viable in a PGG, showing when they are risk-dominant (see Methods) against all de-114
fectors and free-riders (i.e. FAKE, FREE and D players). Yet more importantly, we determine115
when RESTRICT becomes more advantageous than AVOID; that is, when it is worthwhile to116
pay extra cost to invest in restriction technologies and infrastructure that limit the benefits of117
non-committers (D).118
Equation (16) (see Methods) allows one to determine when AVOID and RESTRICT are119
8risk-dominant against FREE. This occurs when120
N∑
k=1
(rc− c− P/k) ≥ (N − 1)(rc− c), (1)
which can be simplified to121
P ≤ c(r − 1)/FN , with FN =
N∑
k=1
1/k (2)
AVOID and RESTRICT are risk-dominant against FAKE if122
N∑
k=1
(
(
rk
N
− 1)c+ Nδ − P
k
− δ
)
≥
N−1∑
k=1
(
rk
N
c− δ
)
. (3)
Which can also be simplified to123
δ ≥ N − r
NFN−1
c+
FN
NFN−1
P . (4)
Now, as we aim to examine when restriction works better than avoiding non-committers, we124
first examine independently when AVOID or RESTRICT are risk-dominant agains D players.125
In case of the AVOID strategy this occurs when:126
P ≤ N(r − 1)c. (5)
As Equation (2) is more restrictive than Equation (5), the two conditions in Equations (2) and127
(4) define when AVOID is risk-dominant against all types of defectors and free-riders (see SI for128
simplifications of these formulas using inequalities for FN ). Both conditions can be understood129
intuitively. For a successful commitment, the cost of arranging the commitment needs to be130
justified with respect to the benefit of (mutual) cooperation (i.e. r(c− 1)), and a compensation131
9needs to be arranged (see Equation 4) that is proportional to the player’s contribution and the132
investment cost she paid for setting up the commitment.133
This observation becomes clearer when looking at the transition probabilities and stationary134
distribution in a population of AVOID players with the other four strategies, as shown in Figure135
1a. Note the cycles from C to defection strategies (FREE, D and FAKE) and back to AVOID136
strategists, showing that defection strategies cannot completely be avoided in the PGG context137
(see also Figure S1): When the cost of arranging commitment, P , is sufficiently small, the138
population spends most of the time in the homogeneous state with AVOID players, regardless of139
the initial composition of the population (Figure 1b). For low P , nearly homogeneous AVOID140
populations are almost always reached for sufficiently large δ. More interestingly, this high141
frequency is not affected by changes in the compensation δ, once a certain threshold is reached.142
Accordingly, as for the PD20, the arrangement cost is the essential parameter for the emergence143
and survival of AVOID and mutual cooperation. Additionally, we observe that for a variety144
of group sizes N , the region of P wherein AVOID is a viable strategy increases (see Figure145
S3, considering also the fact that right hand side of Equation (2) is an increasing function of146
N ): AVOID can handle the commitment free-riding strategies for a wider range of arrangement147
costs. Yet as the groups size increases, the frequency of AVOID, for similar small values of P ,148
decreases, revealing that other strategies may be necessary to cope with the increasing number149
of defectors in the groups and the population (Figure S3). These results provide a novel insight,150
when moving from the PD to the PGG, which is that avoiding defectors by refusing to play the151
game when someone does not agree to commit might lead to cooperation at higher arrangement152
costs, yet may in turn be detrimental for the overall level of cooperation in the game.153
In turn, RESTRICT is risk-dominant against D when154
N−1∑
k=1
rkc(1− ψ)
k + ψ(N − k) ≥ (N − r)c+ FN(P + R). (6)
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Because the left hand side of Equation (6) is a strictly decreasing function of ψ (see SI), the155
necessary condition for RESTRICT to be risk-dominant against D is (i.e. when ψ = 0)156
(N − 1)rc ≥ (N − r)c+ FN(P + R), (7)
which is equivalent to157
P + R ≤ N(r − 1)
FN
c. (8)
As the left hand side of Equation (6) is a continuous function of ψ, the satisfaction of Equation158
(8) guarantees that, for any given P and R, there exists a threshold ψD such that RESTRICT is159
risk-dominant against D for any ψ below it. This restriction threshold could be interpreted as the160
organizational or technological advancement required to guarantee success against individuals161
that exploit the non-exclusive public good. Moreover, it specifies what the limit is on the cost,162
combining the restriction and the proposing costs, for this to work.163
These observations are supported by Figure 2a, where we show the transition probabilities164
and stationary distribution in a population of RESTRICT players with other non-commitment165
proposing strategies. The main difference with Figure 1a, is the increase in the fixation prob-166
ability from D to RESTRICT. This effect depends on the value of restriction factor ψ, as is167
shown in Figure 2b. In general, the better the effect of restriction on non-committers (i.e. the168
smaller ψ), the higher the frequency of RESTRICT and cooperation in the long run, regardless169
of the initial composition of the population. These observations are robust against changes in170
the restriction R, as seen in Figure 2c, where we show the frequency of RESTRICT varying171
both ψ and R. One can observe in both figures that ψ is the decisive parameter on the frequency172
of RESTRICT: To achieve significantly high frequency of RESTRICT, and as a consequence173
cooperation, a stringent restriction of non-committers must be possible. Even when costless174
restriction (i.e. R = 0) is available, the frequency of RESTRICT decreases quickly when ψ175
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approaches 1. Notice that when ψ = 1, RESTRICT is never risk-dominant against D players,176
as can be seen from Equation (6).177
This notable success of the RESTRICT strategy in dealing with non-committers becomes178
even more significant when the group size increases (see Figure 2d). When the cost of restriction179
is extreme (e.g. R = 2), D players dominate when the group size is small. But when the group180
size is sufficiently large, thereby reducing the individual cost of implementing the restriction,181
which is shared by the proposers, RESTRICT becomes dominant. The frequency of RESTRICT182
is even higher when R is small (see already Figure 3b). It is also interesting to note that the183
necessary condition for RESTRICT to be risk-dominant against D, as specified in Equation (8),184
is simpler for larger N , since the right hand side of the equation is an increasing function of N185
(see SI).186
2.3 What to do with the non-committers?187
Since there is no difference between AVOID and RESTRICT, except when playing D, one only188
needs to compare the stationary distribution of AVOID in a population with only D players189
against the stationary distribution of RESTRICT in a similar population. One can show that the190
frequency of RESTRICT is greater than AVOID if and only if the ratio of transition probabilities191
from D to RESTRICT and vice versa is greater than the ratio of transition probabilities from192
D to AVOID and vice versa, which can further be simplified, in the large population limit, to32193
(see SI)194
N−1∑
k=1
rkc(1− ψ)
k + ψ(N − k) − (N − r)c− FN(P + R) ≥ rc− c− P/N, (9)
which is equivalent to195
N−1∑
k=1
k(1− ψ)
ψN + k(1− ψ)rc− FNR − FN−1P − (N − 1)c ≥ 0. (10)
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The left hand side of this equation is a decreasing function of ψ, R and P , but increasing in r196
(see proofs in SI). Note that the cost P still persists because RESTRICT players need to pay197
this cost when there are D players in the group, while AVOID players do not have to pay it as198
they refuse to play with D players (thereby not arranging any commitment deal).199
An observation that can be derived immediately from Equation (10) is that, when ψ = 1,200
the equation is not satisfied. That is, unless restriction is possible, at least to some degree, it is201
better to refuse to play with those who explicitly do not agree to commit. Furthermore, with202
ψ = 0 we obtain the necessary condition for RESTRICT to be favored over AVOID:203
(r − 1)c ≥ FN
N − 1R +
FN−1
N − 1P . (11)
It means the cost of arranging the agreement and restricting the benefit of non-contributors204
needs to be justified with respect to the benefit of the PGG. Only in that case can restriction205
become justified over avoidance or non-participation. If this equation is not satisfied, AVOID206
is the better commitment strategy, however good the restriction of non-committers that can be207
brought about, including full exclusion or ostracism.208
In addition, as the left hand side of Equation (10) is a continuous function of ψ, this equa-209
tion guarantees that, for any given P and R, there exists a threshold ψAVOID which, for any210
ψ < ψAVOID , RESTRICT performs better than AVOID. This threshold moreover increases with211
r and can approach infinitely close to 1 when r tends to infinity, because, as mentioned above,212
the left hand side of this equation is a decreasing function of ψ, but increasing in r (see Figures213
S4 and S5 in SI). In addition, the equation provides the criteria for whether it is worthwhile214
to develop the restriction infrastructure or mechanism. As technological evolution may signifi-215
cantly (and unlimitedly) reduce the cost-to-impact ratio, for instance with respect to restriction216
mechanisms that require computing and communication power33,34, one can postulate that un-217
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der this condition RESTRICT will eventually be available and deployable, even when currently218
AVOID seems to be the best choice.219
Figure 3a shows the region of parameters where RESTRICT is better than AVOID, gener-220
ated from the analytical condition in Equation (10). There is a large range of costs for restricting221
the access of non-committers, R, and the effect of restriction, ψ, where RESTRICT is better222
than AVOID. Yet, if R is too large, even a full exclusion (ostracism) does not lead to a better223
commitment strategy (as also can be seen from Equation (11)). These analytical results are com-224
patible with the numerical simulation results shown in Figure 2c (see SI for more comparisons,225
Figure S6).226
In addition, because the right hand side of Equation (11) is a decreasing function of N ,227
converging to 0 when N approaches infinity (see proofs in SI), AVOID is less preferred for228
increasing N : As group size increases (see Figure 3b), the frequency of the strategy decreases.229
This indicates that avoiding non-committers in larger groups is less successful than avoiding230
them in smaller ones. Interestingly, RESTRICT seems to cope better with changes in group231
size: As group size increases, RESTRICT becomes more frequent than AVOID for a larger232
value of the restriction cost. When the cost of restriction is small (e.g. R = 0.25), RESTRICT233
ensures a higher level of committers, and as a consequence contributors, in comparison to the234
AVOID strategy. Even when the restriction cost is high, there is a certain group size for which235
RESTRICT is more abundant than AVOID, see Figure 3b. Furthermore, as can be seen in236
Figures S4 and S5, whenN increases, RESTRICT is the better strategy for strictly larger ranges237
of P , R and ψ, which becomes even more apparent for increasing values of the public good’s238
multiplication factor r.239
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3 Discussion240
We have shown that arranging prior commitment can lead to the evolution of cooperation in241
a PGG when the cost of arranging commitment is justified with respect to the benefit of co-242
operation. As such, this result generalizes the conclusions previously obtained for the PD20,243
underlining again the evolutionary advantage of this capacity to make prior agreements in com-244
bination with the capacity to send signals and act accordingly1,35. Moreover, we show that even245
though the commitment strategies become viable for a wider range of the arrangement cost246
when moving from the PD to the PGG, and more generally, when the group size of the PGG247
increases, it might be detrimental for the overall level of cooperation when the cost of arrange-248
ment is low. Nonetheless, prior agreements remain more efficient in achieving cooperation249
when being compared to simple peer punishment9,36 (see Figure S7) in the PGG, an important250
result we observed also in case of the PD scenario20.251
Notwithstanding this efficiency with respect to punishment, individuals that do not accept252
an agreement (D) or individuals that free-ride on the investment that commitment proposers253
make (FREE) may increase in frequency within both the PD and PGG contexts as the cost of254
setting up the commitment increases. We examined here in detail how to deal with the former:255
Either the commitment proposers can decide to avoid interacting with those non-committers256
(AVOID) or implement an infrastructure that allows them to restrict their access (RESTRICT),257
which corresponds to a reduction in the benefit they can obtain from the public good. For both258
strategies it is assumed that an institution is present in order to enforce the compensation when259
someone in the commitment does not honor it. As such, both strategies are closely related to260
pool punishment models in terms of the presence of a third party required for the execution of261
the process9,22. Yet AVOID and RESTRICT are also different from pool punishment as in the262
latter system no prior agreement on the posterior compensations is made. Additionally, the main263
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difference between AVOID and RESTRICT, in terms of execution, is that, AVOID does not pay264
to set up the agreement when someone does not accept the agreement, whereas RESTRICT265
always initiates the agreement to play and pays an additional fee to the institution to reduce the266
access of the (explicit) non-committers.267
We show here that for both strategies one can identify intuitive conditions, defined by costs268
and compensations, that lead to increased likelihood in receiving contributions for the common269
good. Furthermore, we have compared the AVOID and RESTRICT strategies and provided270
analytical conditions for when one mechanism is better than the other. Our results show that271
RESTRICT is better than AVOID if non-committers can be restricted to a certain degree, with272
a small enough cost. Otherwise, it is better to rely on AVOID, i.e. simply refuse to interact if273
there are non-committers in the group (or, if the interaction is mandatory, to not contribute when274
playing the PGG). The restriction effect ψ, which is defined as the reduction of the benefit of275
the non-committer, was shown to be a decisive factor. Interestingly, its threshold ψAVOID (i.e.276
for all ψ < ψAVOID , RESTRICT is better than AVOID) increases with r and can be infinitely277
close to 1. This indicates that for given costs and compensations of commitment, any restriction278
mechanism can be more advantageous than AVOID when the PGG is sufficiently beneficial.279
Moving from pairwise to multi-player interactions requires an analysis of the role of the280
group size in relation to the viability of the commitment strategies. Indeed, as group size in-281
creases, RESTRICT becomes more viable than AVOID even when it is costlier to implement282
the restriction measure. Furthermore, it is so for a strictly larger range of the commitment costs283
and restriction factors, especially when the public good’s producing factor (r) is high. As such,284
these results indicate that larger public goods with higher levels of contribution can be estab-285
lished once restriction becomes possible. The amount of restriction depends on the gain each286
participant gets from the public good: the lower the gain, the tougher the restriction needs to287
be.288
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These results differ from other observations related to the impact of group size on the level289
of cooperation in PGG37,38: Lehmann et al.37 showed that if the group size can be expanded290
stochastically, for instance, as a result of an increase in fecundity and/or a decrease in mortality,291
the kin-competition pressure induced by the limited dispersal in their networked model, can292
be significantly reduced, thereby favoring the evolution of cooperative behavior. In a similar293
manner, Alizon and Taylor38 showed that if the group size and compositions can be adapted294
over time, in a way that reduces the competition among relatives in a structured population (by295
allowing groups or patches with high fecundity rates to grow faster), the cooperation level is296
increased.297
In contrast, the strategic mechanisms we examine here do not consider any forms of relat-298
edness between group members or structured populations. The essential message is that for299
smaller groups one is better off to avoid individuals that do not wish to accept an agreement,300
prior to the game, when the cost of restriction is too large. Yet as group size increases, re-301
striction mechanisms are more efficient in achieving cooperation, depending on the association302
with the restriction. As such these results provide a completely new perspective on the role of303
group size on the level of cooperation. We envisage that AVOID and RESTRICT may also be304
more efficient in a structured population because the free-riders can be avoided and excluded305
permanently by removing links with them. Furthermore, an introduction of relatedness among306
individuals may reduce the need for arranging commitments as it provides additional incentive307
to not free-ride. Both issues may be explored in subsequent papers.308
The results presented here are in accordance with the outcomes of different behavioral com-309
mitment experiments6,19,28,29. High levels of cooperation were observed in a PGG experiment310
where a binding agreement, which was enabled through a prior communication stage among the311
members of the group, could be arranged before the PGG interaction occurs6. The experiment312
showed that whenever a commitment deal is not binding or not enforced, corresponding to a low313
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compensation cost δ in our commitment models, defectors are widespread and the contribution314
level is low. Commitment can also take the form of a deposit-refund scheme19, where those315
who agree to commit have to deposit an amount which will be refunded only if they fulfill the316
commitment and contribute to the public good. Similarly to our results for the AVOID strategy,317
the most successful commitment strategy in that work was shown to be the one that refuses to318
set up the public good whenever there is a non-committer in the group (RESTRICT was not con-319
sidered). The outcome of this deposit-refund experiment showed that when the deposit amount,320
corresponding to δ in our model, is sufficiently high, the contribution level is significant19. Note,321
however, that in both these experiments6,19, the cost of setting up the commitment is always set322
to 0, thereby leading to effortless and effective commitment strategies. But as we have shown,323
this cost is the decisive factor for the viability of commitments strategies. This said, despite the324
fact that commitment has been shown experimentally to be a successful strategy for promoting325
cooperation in the PGG, our results further the understanding of the mechanism by identify-326
ing under which region of the parameters’ values the mechanism works (as in the experiments)327
and when it does not. As a result, the outcome of our analysis suggests the need to study how328
varying the parameters would affect the outcomes of those commitment experiments.329
Furthermore, PGG experiments, where exclusion of disapproved members (for example,330
through voting) is allowed, exhibit a high level of contribution and commitment28,29. But therein331
exclusion is carried out after the PGG takes place, towards the observed non-contributors, as332
in the model of Sasaki and Uchida39, which is different from our model where restriction oc-333
curs before the game takes place. This suggests that social exclusion or ostracism, even when334
it requires an additional cost and/or has a reduced effect in terms of the restriction, is an im-335
portant mechanism for promoting group cooperation26,29. However, we envisage that exclusion336
imposed through arranging prior commitment as in this work may be more suitable in the case337
where there is rivalry in the game, as is the case for Common-pool Resource games8, as in that338
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case posterior restriction would not hinder the participating players in collecting their benefit.339
Various extensions to the current model can be addressed. First, one can consider to move340
beyond the symmetric commitments, where the cost for arranging and managing the agreement341
is equally shared among the proposers. Asymmetric commitments, where the contribution to342
manage the agreement may depend on the wealth and the potential benefits of each member343
as in inequality models40,41, may further increase the realism of the conclusions one can draw344
from these models. Moreover, when extending to the repeated interaction scenario42, it is also345
natural to consider that those who benefited more from the previous interactions should con-346
tribute more to the management of the commitments. We envisage that these seemingly fairer347
ways of sharing the benefit and cost of commitment can elevate the willingness to commit and348
contribute. In this repeated interaction context, commitments can also be made incrementally,349
conditional on behaviors of others in the previous round of interaction; this option has been350
shown to promote a higher level of contribution in a repeated PGG experiment43.351
In summary, our results have demonstrated that arranging prior commitments provides an352
important pathway for the emerge of cooperation in the one-shot Public Good Games, suggest-353
ing that good agreements make good friends20 also in group interactions. Furthermore, always354
avoiding to play with those unwilling to commit is detrimental for the overall level of contri-355
bution, especially when interacting in large groups, and restriction towards those players might356
provide a better path to enhance the contribution level.357
4 Methods358
4.1 Population setup and evolutionary dynamics359
Both the analytical and numerical results obtained here use Evolutionary Game Theory meth-360
ods for finite populations10,44,45. In such a setting, individuals’ payoff represents their fitness361
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or social success, and evolutionary dynamics is shaped by social learning10,46,47, whereby the362
most successful individuals will tend to be imitated more often by the others. In the current363
work, social learning is modeled using the so-called pairwise comparison rule48, assuming that364
an individual A with fitness fA adopts the strategy of another individual B with fitness fB with365
probability given by the Fermi function,
(
1 + e−β(fB−fA)
)−1. The parameter β represents the366
‘imitation strength’ or ‘intensity of selection’, i.e., how strongly the individuals base their de-367
cision to imitate on fitness comparison. For β = 0, we obtain the limit of neutral drift – the368
imitation decision is random. For large β, imitation becomes increasingly deterministic.369
In the absence of mutations or exploration, the end states of evolution are inevitably monomor-370
phic: once such a state is reached, it cannot be escaped through imitation. We thus further371
assume that, with a certain mutation probability, an individual switches randomly to a different372
strategy without imitating another individual. In the limit of small mutation rates, the behav-373
ioral dynamics can be conveniently described by a Markov Chain, where each state represents374
a monomorphic population, whereas the transition probabilities are given by the fixation proba-375
bility of a single mutant9,45,49. The resulting Markov Chain has a stationary distribution, which376
characterizes the average time the population spends in each of these monomorphic end states.377
In finite populations, the groups engaging in PGG are given by multivariate hypergeometric
sampling. For transition between two pure states (small mutation rate), this reduces to sampling
(without replacement) from a hypergeometric distribution9. Denote
H(k,N,m,Z) =
(
m
k
)(
Z −m
N − k
)
(
Z
N
)
Let Πij(k) and Πji(k) denote the payoff of a strategists of type i and j, respectively, when378
the random sampling consists of k players of type i and N − k players of type j (as given in379
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the payoff matrix in Equation (1) in SI). Hence, in a population of x i-strategists and (Z − x)380
j-strategists, the average payoffs to i− and j− strategists are9,10:381
Pij(x) =
N−1∑
k=0
H(k,N − 1, x− 1, Z − 1) Πij(k + 1)
=
N−1∑
k=0
(
x− 1
k
)(
Z − x
N − 1− k
)
(
Z − 1
N − 1
) Πij(k + 1) (12)
Pji(x) =
N−1∑
k=0
H(k,N − 1, x, Z − 1) Πji(k)
=
N−1∑
k=0
(
x
k
)(
Z − 1− x
N − 1− k
)
(
Z − 1
N − 1
) Πji(k) (13)
Note that several Pij(x) can be further simplified (see Supporting Information). Now, the prob-382
ability to change the number k of individuals using strategy i by ±1 in each time step can be383
written as48384
T±(k) =
Z − k
Z
k
Z
[
1 + e∓β[Pij(k)−Pji(k)]
]−1
. (14)
The fixation probability of a single mutant with a strategy i in a population of (Z−1) individuals385
using j is given by45,48–50386
ρj,i =
(
1 +
N−1∑
i=1
i∏
j=1
T−(j)
T+(j)
)−1
. (15)
In the limit of neutral selection (i.e. β = 0), ρB,A equals the inverse of population size, 1/Z.387
Considering a set {1, ..., q} of different strategies, these fixation probabilities determine a388
transition matrix M = {Tij}qi,j=1, with Tij,j 6=i = ρji/(q − 1) and Tii = 1 −
∑q
j=1,j 6=i Tij , of a389
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Markov Chain. The normalized eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue 1 of the transposed390
ofM provides the stationary distribution described above45,49,50, describing the relative time the391
population spends adopting each of the strategies.392
393
4.2 Risk-dominance condition394
An important analytical criteria to determine the viability of a given strategy is whether it is risk-395
dominant with respect to other strategies13,32. Namely, one considers which selection direction396
is more probable: an i mutant fixating in a homogeneous population of individuals playing j or397
a j mutant fixating in a homogeneous population of individuals playing i. When the first is more398
likely than the latter, i is said to be risk-dominant against j 32, which holds for any intensity of399
selection and in the limit of large Z when400
N∑
k=1
Πij(k) ≥
N−1∑
k=0
Πji(k). (16)
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Figure Legends513
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Figure 1. (a) Stationary distribution and fixation probabilities. The population spends
most of the time in the homogenous state of AVOID. The black arrows identify the
advantageous transitions, where ρN = 1/Z denotes the neutral fixation probability. The dashed
lines denote neutral transitions. Note the cyclic pattern from cooperation to defection to
commitment strategies and back. (b) Contour plot of the frequency of AVOID as a function
of P and δ. For a small enough cost of arranging the commitment, AVOID is abundant
whenever a sufficient compensation is associated with the commitment deal. Parameters:
N = 5, Z = 100, r = 3; β = 0.1; In panel a, P = 0.25, δ = 2.
Figure 2. (a) Transition probabilities and stationary distributions in case of RESTRICT.
For an efficient restriction (R = 0.5 and ψ = 0.25), the population spends most of the time in
the homogenous state of RESTRICT. Notations are the same as in Figure 1a. (b) Frequencies
of each strategy for varying ψ, in case of RESTRICT. For a given cost of restriction
(R = 0.5), in general the better the effect of restriction on non-committers (i.e. the smaller ψ),
the greater the frequency of RESTRICT. (c) Frequency of RESTRICT as a function of R
and ψ, in a population with C, D, FREE and FAKE strategies. For a large range of cost for
restricting the access of non-committers, R, and the restriction, ψ, RESTRICT is highly
frequent, having a higher frequency than AVOID. The double-stroke line corresponds to the
part having the same frequency as AVOID (i.e. 0.64, with the same parameter values), and the
area below this line identifies the area in which RESTRICT is more frequent than AVOID. In
general, the larger R, the smaller ψ is required for RESTRICT to be advantageous to AVOID.
(d) Frequencies of each strategy as a function of the group size, N . RESTRICT becomes
more frequent when the group size increases, even for a rather high cost of restriction
(R = 2.0). Parameters: In panels a, b, c: N = 5; in all cases, Z = 100, r = 3;
P = 0.25, δ = 2; β = 0.1.
Figure 3. (a) Range of parameters ψ, R and P , generated from the analytical formula in
Equation (10), in which RESTRICT is better than AVOID. For a large range of cost for
restricting the access of non-committers, R, and the effect of restriction, ψ, RESTRICT is
better than AVOID. In general, the larger R, the smaller ψ is required for RESTRICT to be
advantageous to AVOID. (b) Group size is an important factor for making RESTRICT
more viable than AVOID. We compute, as a function of the group size, N , the frequencies of
RESTRICT for different values of restriction cost R (the curves without markers), in
comparison to the frequency of AVOID (the red curve with circled markers). In general, the
lower the cost of restriction, the higher the frequency of RESTRICT. Also, the threshold of N
above which RESTRICT is more frequent than AVOID is smaller. Parameters: in panel b,
Z = 100, P = 0.25, ψ = 0.25, β = 0.1; In both panels, N = 5, r = 3.
